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Russell D. Covey∗
Abstract
This Article introduces a new concept—“longitudinal guilt”—which
invites readers to reconsider basic presuppositions about the way our
criminal justice system determines guilt in criminal cases. In short, the
idea is that a variety of features of criminal procedure, most
importantly, plea bargaining, conspire to change the primary
“truthfinding mission” of criminal law from one of adjudicating
individual historical cases to one of identifying dangerous “offenders.”
This change of mission is visible in the lower proof standards we apply
to repeat criminal offenders.
The first section of this Article explains how plea bargaining and
graduated sentencing systems based on criminal history effectively
combine to lower the standard of proof for repeat criminals. The second
section describes several additional procedural and evidentiary rules
that further effectively reduce the standard of proof for recidivists. The
third section argues that the net effect is a criminal justice system that is
primarily focused on the identification of a class of “dangerous
offenders” based upon their repeated interactions with the system over
time rather than the accurate resolution of specific allegations of
wrongdoing in individual cases, as is conventionally supposed. In a
phrase, we have moved toward a system that constructs guilt
“longitudinally.” This Article concludes with a few brief thoughts on
the merits and demerits of longitudinal guilt.
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INTRODUCTION

A prominent assumption of criminal law is that there is a uniform,
and uniformly demanding, burden of proof that must be met by the
prosecution in order to convict a defendant. That burden of proof—
beyond a reasonable doubt, or BARD for short—is a matter of both
faith and constitutional law; the Supreme Court has long recognized the
prosecutor’s burden to prove each element of a charged crime to this
standard.1 Most theorists who have written about the standard of proof
in criminal cases assume that the BARD standard requires fact-finders
to be very certain of the defendant’s guilt before returning a guilty
verdict. Those prone to think quantitatively have suggested that the
BARD standard represents something like a 90%–95% likelihood of
guilt.2
The BARD standard is conventionally thought to have a fixed, if
somewhat imprecise, meaning that does not vary from case to case. As a
formal matter, the same reasonable doubt proof standard applies to
jaywalking and capital murder trials alike.3 Opinions differ, however,
regarding whether this is really an accurate description of criminal law,
and if it is, whether this is normatively desirable. Scholars such as Dean
Erik Lillquist have argued that the unwavering BARD label masks a
variable substantive standard and that this substantive variability is a
good thing.4 Another school of thought takes the position that BARD in
fact represents an unwavering standard but that variability, if we could
capture it, would be normatively preferable. Recent work by Professors
1. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970).
2. See, e.g., Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L. REV.
951, 996 (2003) (“[P]roof beyond a reasonable doubt is generally defined, insofar as it or any
burden of proof can be quantified, as a percentage as high as 85% or 95%.”); Christopher
Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise Redux, 56 EMORY L.J. 275, 306 (2006) (describing “the
standard quantifications of ‘proof beyond a reasonable doubt’ as a 90 to 95% degree of
certainty”); Lawrence M. Solan, Refocusing the Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases: Some
Doubt About Reasonable Doubt, 78 TEX. L. REV. 105, 126 (1999) (citing surveys of judges
indicating belief that jurors should be roughly 90% certain of guilt before convicting under
reasonable doubt standard).
3. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 (holding that the Due Process Clause requires
prosecutors to prove each element of every criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt).
4. See generally Erik Lillquist, Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and the
Virtues of Variability, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85 (2002) (arguing that a variable reasonable
doubt standard is preferable to a fixed standard).
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Ronald Allen and Larry Laudan,5 and more explicit work by Laudan in
follow-up papers, take this position.6
The argument is simple and seemingly compelling. The expected
utility theory teaches that rational actors operating under uncertainty
will seek to maximize their utility by selecting choices that hold the
greatest expected utility understood as “the sum of the utility of the
possible outcomes after the decision, weighed by the probability of each
possible outcome.”7 In a criminal case, there are four possible outcomes
a jury must consider: a true conviction of a guilty person, a true
acquittal of an innocent person, a false conviction of an innocent person,
and a false acquittal of a guilty person. Thus, as Lillquist explains:
[T]he expected utility of a decision to convict a defendant
is the utility of an accurate conviction—weighted by the
probability the defendant is in fact guilty—plus the
disutility of an erroneous conviction—weighted by the
probability the defendant is in fact not guilty.
Proponents of a high standard of proof point to the presumed nonequivalence in expected (dis)utilities of false acquittals and false
convictions. False convictions are commonly thought to be substantially
worse—that is, to have a greater expected disutility—than false
acquittals.8 That assumption undergirds the widely embraced cliché—
sometimes referred to as the Blackstone Ratio—that it is better to acquit
5. See generally Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, 41 TEX. TECH. L.
REV. 65 (2008); Larry Laudan & Ronald J. Allen, Deadly Dilemmas II: Bail and Crime, 85
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23 (2010). Allen and Laudan argue that rather than looking at the ratio of
false acquittals and false convictions to gauge whether the system is performing appropriately, it
is far more sensible to compare the (negative) utility of false convictions to the (negative) utility
of false acquittals. That ratio, at least, tells us something about how costly it is when the legal
system produces an inaccurate result and gives us a sense of which side to err on and by how
much. Laudan makes this point more explicitly in a separate paper.
6. See generally Larry Laudan, The Elementary Epistemic Arithmetic of Criminal
Justice, 5 EPISTEME 282 (2008). In subsequent work, Laudan refines this analysis by
demonstrating that the desirable standard of proof, more precisely, depends on the relative
utilities of both true and false convictions and acquittals and thus can only be calculated by
comparing the utilities of all four of the possible trial outcomes. See Larry Laudan & Harry
Saunders, Re-Thinking the Criminal Standard of Proof: Seeking Consensus About the Utilities
of Trial Outcomes, 7 INT’L COMMENT. ON EVIDENCE 1, 3 (2009), available at
http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1099 &context=ice; Larry Laudan, Taking
the Ratio of Differences Seriously: The Multiple Offender and the Standard of Proof, or
Different Strokes for Serial Folks 1 (July 8, 2009) [hereinafter Laudan, Ratio] (unpublished
working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1431616. This refinement does not really
matter for purposes of this paper, and therefore, I will ignore it here.
7. Lillquist, supra note 4, at 90.
8. See, e.g., Keith A. Findley, Toward a New Paradigm of Criminal Justice: How the
Innocence Movement Merges Crime Control and Due Process, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 133, 133–
34 (“Our constitutional system chooses protecting the innocent as a highest-order value, which
preferences innocence protection over convicting wrongdoers.”).
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ten guilty persons than to convict an innocent one.9 A high standard of
proof reflects the intuition that it is better to err on the side of acquitting
arguably innocent defendants, even if it is likely they are guilty, given
the disproportionate disutility of false convictions.
Even if this proposition is true as a general matter, variability
advocates reject the assumption that the disutilities of false convictions
and false acquittals are the same in all cases. Certainly, they argue, false
acquittals of some especially dangerous criminals—say, terrorists, serial
rapists, mass murderers, and the like—are more costly to society if
those false acquittals permit the acquittee to engage in future acts of
terrorism, rape, and murder than are false acquittals of persons who
commit minor crimes or who are less likely to engage in future criminal
conduct.
Indeed, as Laudan points out, this logic can be extended to repeat
offenders as a class. After all, empirical data demonstrate that repeat
offenders commit more crimes after release than first-time offenders.10
If so, the cost to society of falsely acquitting repeat offenders is
necessarily greater than the cost of falsely acquitting first-time
offenders.11 At the same time, false convictions of persons without prior
criminal records hurt society—and those persons12—more than false
convictions of serial criminals, and false acquittals of first-time
offenders cost society less, perhaps far less, than false acquittals of
serial criminals. Based on these observations, Laudan concludes that the
standard of proof should be lower in trials of those with extensive
criminal histories than it is for those without a record of wrongdoing.13
Lillquist reaches the same conclusion.14
I do not quibble with the argument’s premises, which I think, byand-large, are probably correct. What I do take issue with is the
conclusion that affirmative change in the formal standard of proof is
warranted.15 That conclusion necessarily assumes that the criminal
justice system currently assesses the guilt or innocence of repeat
offenders no differently than first-time offenders. This is incorrect.
The mistake, I contend, is that those arguing for a lower formal or
informal proof standard at trial pay too much attention to trials and the
formal rules applicable to them and fail to take sufficient account of
plea bargaining, which is, after all, responsible for producing the vast
9. See Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 174 (1997) (“The ratio
10:1 has become known as the ‘Blackstone ratio.’”).
10. See Laudan, Ratio, supra note 6, at 5–6.
11. Id.
12. See infra Part I.C.
13. See Laudan, Ratio, supra note 6, at 2.
14. See Lillquist, supra note 4, at 195 (“[C]ases involving repeat offenders perhaps should
also have a lower standard of proof because the relative benefits of convictions, and the relative
costs of acquittals, are higher than in other cases.”).
15. See, e.g., Laudan, Ratio, supra note 6, at 4 (“[W]e should be using a very different
standard of proof for trying serial felons than we use for trying first-time offenders.”).
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majority of criminal convictions in both state and federal courts.16 When
the dynamics of plea bargaining are taken into account, what emerges, I
believe, is a de facto system of justice that for the vast majority of
repeat offenders already downwardly adjusts the effective standard of
proof so that typical repeat offenders ultimately are judged by proof
standards lower than the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt-standard formally
on the books and, perhaps, sometimes little higher than mere probable
cause.
In the first section of this Article, I will explain how plea bargaining
and graduated sentencing systems based on criminal history combine to
effectively lower the standard of proof for repeat offenders. In the
second section, I will describe several additional procedural and
evidentiary rules that further effectively reduce the standard of proof for
alleged recidivists.17 The net effect, I argue in the Article’s third section,
is a criminal justice system far more concerned with identifying and
incapacitating “dangerous offenders” than with producing accurate
results in individual cases. In effect, we have developed a system that
constructs guilt longitudinally. The Article concludes with a few brief
thoughts on the merits and demerits of longitudinal guilt.
I. PLEA BARGAINING AND THE DECREASING STANDARD OF PROOF FOR
REPEAT OFFENDERS
To understand how plea bargaining effectively reduces the standard
of proof for repeat offenders, we must review the incentive structures
that induce defendants to plead guilty.18 Although criminal
defendants—like shoppers—do not always get the best bargain possible,
plea bargaining—like shopping—can best be understood by looking to
the market that sets the relevant prices of the sought-for goods.
A. The Price of Guilty Pleas
There are three principal inputs in the standard formula for pricing
plea bargains: the probability of conviction (p), the expected sentence if
convicted at trial (ets), and the resource costs of litigating the case (rd
for defendant, rp for prosecutor).19 The relationship of these inputs can
16. See Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-Based
Ceilings, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1237, 1238 (2008) (reporting that more than 95% of all state and
federal felony convictions are obtained by guilty pleas).
17. In using the term “recidivists,” I refer to those defendants who have accumulated
criminal histories. I do not mean to imply that all such defendants are, in fact, guilty of all the
crimes for which they are charged or that they are inherently, and unpreventably, bent on
pursuing a life of crime.
18. A rich literature exists discussing the economics of plea bargaining. See, e.g., Frank
H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289 (1983); Robert
E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909 (1992).
19. See William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61, 61
(1971); Jennifer F. Reinganum, Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion, 78 AM. ECON.
REV. 713, 714 (1988); Covey, supra note 16, at 1246.
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be expressed in a formula, where rps is the rational plea sentence:
rps = (p)(ets)(rd / rp)
This formula expresses a simple and relatively obvious fact about plea
bargaining: The more likely conviction looks, and the greater the
sentence the defendant expects if convicted at trial, the greater the
magnitude of the plea sentence that a rational defendant will accept to
avoid trial. Similarly, the more expensive it is to litigate the case, the
higher the plea sentence a defendant will be willing to accept, and
conversely, the lower the sentence a prosecutor will settle for.
For our purposes, I assume the defendant’s resource costs are zero.
This assumption is not actually true, of course. Defendants do pay a
price to contest criminal charges. However, because most criminal
defendants are indigent and thus do not absorb the full costs of trial—
indeed, the monetary cost of defending indigents is usually borne by the
state—I think this assumption is sufficient for our purposes.20 Dropping
resource costs from the defendant’s side of the equation, the inputs that
remain, which determine whether the plea offer will look attractive, are
simply the probability of conviction (p) and the expected trial sentence
(ets).21 If the plea offer is lower than the product of those two inputs, a
rational defendant should take the deal.22 For our purposes, it is
important to note the dynamic relationship between p and ets. All things
equal, rational defendants should be willing to accept the same plea
offer in cases where p is low and ets is high, and where p is high and ets
is low, as long as the product of p and ets remains constant.23
This plea pricing mechanism causes variation among different types
of defendants with respect to the effective standard of proof. Begin with
20. Net costs of litigation, in other words, are likely to be tilted toward the state, which
means that, generally speaking, prosecutors will be willing to discount plea offers downwardly
more than defendants are willing to adjust them upwardly.
21. As Professor Oren Gazal-Ayal explains:
Plea bargaining is rationalized just like any other legal settlement. Whether
guilty or innocent, a defendant knows he might be convicted at trial. Taking
into account the post-trial sentence and the probability of conviction, he
determines his “highest acceptable sentence.” A defendant will only be willing
to plead guilty in return for a sentence lower than or equal to his highest
acceptable sentence.
Oren Gazal-Ayal, Partial Ban on Plea Bargains, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 2302 (2006).
22. If we also consider resource costs in the defendant’s calculation, it becomes apparent
that defendants sometimes have incentives to accept a plea offer that equals, or even exceeds,
expected trial punishment.
23. A defendant’s aversion to risk could impact decisionmaking in this context, but the
impact could go in either direction. Risk-averse defendants might place greater value on plea
offers that eliminate a small risk of a disastrously long sentence. Risk-seeking defendants, on the
other hand, might undervalue such plea offers where a plea bargain represents a certain (though
small) punishment and the odds of conviction seem small.
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the fact of graduated sentencing schemes that increase punishment
based on criminal history. Recidivist punishment schemes are
manifested in several ways. Sentencing guideline systems predictably
increase sentencing exposure. Mandatory minimum sentencing
provisions further lock in, with certainty, high sentences upon
conviction for certain offenses or for offenders with criminal histories.
Career criminal statutes create especially draconian, fixed sentence
outcomes for serial offenders. Even absent legislative or administrative
sentencing mandates, judges with complete sentencing discretion can be
expected to impose harsher sentences on repeat offenders. Accordingly,
there is no question that, in general, the more extensive a defendant’s
criminal history, the greater the defendant’s expected trial sentence will
be for most crimes. 24
Next, most prosecutors are not primarily concerned with maximizing
jail time for convicted offenders.25 For most prosecutors in most cases,
winning a conviction is more important than maximizing punishment.26
Where there is a tradeoff between those goals, the typical prosecutor
will almost always settle for less punishment in exchange for
elimination of the possibility of an acquittal at trial.27 That prosecutors
routinely trade maximum punishment for reduction of uncertainty is
24. See David A. Dana, Rethinking the Puzzle of Escalating Penalties for Repeat
Offenders, 110 YALE L.J. 733, 735 (2001) (observing that the principle of enhanced punishment
for repeat offenders is pervasive at all levels of criminal justice system and “so widely accepted
that it strikes most people as simple common sense”).
25. See Oren Gazal-Ayal & Limor Riza, Plea-Bargaining and Prosecution, in CRIMINAL
LAW AND ECONOMICS 145, 152 (Nuno Garoupa ed., 2009) (noting that plea bargains differ
substantially from other legal settlements where litigants seek to maximize expected profits, in
that the length of sentences and the resource costs of achieving the sentences are
incommensurate, and “as agents of society,” prosecutors lack “an interest in maximizing the
sentence in each case, since excessive sentences are costly to the public”); Josh Bowers,
Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1141 (2008) (“[Prosecutors] care little, if at
all, about maximizing plea prices and ultimate sentence length.”).
26. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2463, 2471 (2004) (noting that for prosecutors, the “statistic of conviction . . . matters
much more than the sentence”); Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to
Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 137 (2004) (reporting practice in
prosecutors’ offices of publicly tracking prosecutors’ win-loss records, or maintaining “batting
averages”).
27. See MILTON HEUMANN, P LEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS,
JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 107 (1978) (finding that, “As prosecutors gain
experience . . . they tend to stress ‘certainty of time’ rather than ‘amount of time. . . . [In other
words], they become less concerned about extracting maximum penalties from defendants and
more concerned with insuring that in cases in which they are looking for time, the defendant
actually receives some time.”); Bowers, supra note 25 (arguing that at least in low stakes cases,
prosecutors “care little, if at all, about maximizing plea prices and ultimate sentence length”);
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2548, 2553–54 (2004) (stating, “[P]rosecutors do not try to maximize total prison
time . . . . [because] legally authorized sentence[s] [are] harsher than the sentence prosecutors
want to impose.”).
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amply evidenced by the massive reliance upon plea bargaining to
resolve criminal cases.28 Even if prosecutors were solely focused on
maximizing jail-time for persons charged with crimes, seeking the
maximum possible punishment for every criminal defendant would not
make sense. Because the resource costs of trial are so high, prosecutors
who refused to plea bargain would, in the aggregate, convict and punish
far fewer criminals than prosecutors who plea bargain.29 While there are
always a few high-profile cases in which prosecutors aggressively seek
to maximize punishment and forgo punishment-reducing deals, those
cases are the exception, not the rule.30
Now put those two facts together. Recidivist sentencing schemes
mean that repeat offenders can expect more severe sentences if they are
convicted at trial than first-time offenders. Prosecutors’ preference for
certain convictions over maximum penalties means that prosecutors will
favor plea bargains that ensure, whenever possible, that a criminal
defendant pleads guilty and receives at least some punishment rather
than risk the possibility of an acquittal at trial. Longer sentences provide
more bargaining leverage than short sentences, and thus, assuming the
existence of a floor on the charge/sentence that will be deemed adequate
by the prosecutor, create comparatively greater flexibility to offer plea
discounts.31 As a result, prosecutors should find it easier to plea bargain
with repeat offenders than with first-timers.32
For an illustration, imagine the following. Two criminals, Newbie
and Old-School, are both caught with cocaine in their possession and
are charged with a drug offense. Prosecutors believe both are guilty, but
because of some weaknesses in the cases (say, the evidence is based on
28. Or to use Professor David Bjerk’s formulation, “prosecutors are risk-averse with
respect to sentence length” due to the diminishing marginal utility of longer sentences. David
Bjerk, On the Role of Plea Bargaining and the Distribution of Sentences in the Absence of
Judicial System Frictions, 28 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 1, 3 (2008).
29. Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 309 (noting that plea prices are set based on a
prosecutor’s punishment-maximizing strategy, which includes sharing the resource gains
obtained by forgoing trial).
30. See, e.g., David Bierie & Kathryn Murphy, The Influence of Press Coverage on
Prosecutorial Discretion: Examining Homicide Prosecutions, 1990–2000, 41 CRIM. L. BULL.
60, 63 (2005) (finding that, “[M]any prosecutors indicated they would not plea bargain a case if
it was receiving media attention.”).
31. Professor Bjerk has documented in an empirical study the tendency for prosecutors in
states with three-strikes laws to use such laws to increase their bargaining leverage. See David
Bjerk, Making the Crime Fit the Penalty: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion Under
Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, 48 J.L. & ECON. 591, 591 (2005) (“[P]rosecutors become
significantly more likely to lower a defendant’s prosecution charge to a misdemeanor when
conviction for the initial felony arrest charge would lead to sentencing under a three-strikes
law.”).
32. The existence of a minimum charge or sentence as a floor is critical to the argument
that there is a variable standard of proof at work for repeat offenders. If prosecutors have infinite
ability to discount plea offers, then higher criminal penalties will not create any more bargaining
leverage than lower penalties, only longer sentences. But there is a floor, for reasons I discuss
below. See infra Part I.C.
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easily impeachable witnesses), an objective assessment of the
probability of conviction in the two cases is 50%. As this would be
Newbie’s first felony conviction, if convicted he expects to receive a
two-year sentence. Old-School, in contrast, has several prior felony
convictions. He expects a four-year sentence if convicted. The
prosecutor is authorized to offer both defendants a plea deal carrying a
one-year sentence. Now compare the value of the offer from the
perspective of the two defendants. For Old-School, the offer is a good
one. Because a 50% chance of getting four years is equal to a 100%
chance of two years, the prosecutor’s offer of just one year cuts OldSchool’s expected jail-time in half. If he is rational, he should take the
deal. Newbie’s calculus, however, is different. The one-year offer is
merely equal to the expected value of proceeding to trial, making
Newbie, at best, rationally indifferent to the offer in terms of jail time.
Other considerations, which I will discuss below, would likely push
Newbie to reject the deal. Recidivist sentencing provisions thus quite
clearly make it easier for prosecutors to obtain guilty pleas from repeat
criminals than from first-timers.
Although the operative variable in the example is expected
punishment, the outcome—Old School taking a plea offer that Newbie
will reject—is functionally identical to one where variation occurred not
in expected sentence but in probability of conviction, or p. If Newbie
faces a two-year sentence upon conviction and he is offered a one-year
deal to resolve the charges, rationally he should take the deal as long as
he calculates p as greater than 50%. In contrast, facing a potential
punishment twice as severe, Old-School rationally should take the deal
as long as he calculates p as greater than 25%. The prosecutor, in other
words, should be able to secure a conviction against Old-School in a
case that is twice as weak as the case necessary to get Newbie to plead
guilty. Moreover, a prosecutor unsatisfied with the prospect of Newbie
and Old-School receiving the same sentence has flexibility, given the
numbers, to ensure that Old-School receives more punishment than
Newbie even though his case remains weaker than the one against
Newbie. For example, Old-School should be willing to accept a plea
offer of 1.5 years if he calculates p as greater than 38%. Given the
existence of the recidivist sentencing penalties, a prosecutor could
negotiate a one-year sentence in Newbie’s case, while obtaining a 1.5
year sentence in a case against Old-School in which the evidence was
only four-fifths as strong.
Of course, the attractiveness of any particular offer will be affected
by a defendant’s subjective preferences as to time discounting and risk
aversion.33 But while both of those factors complicate the math, they do
33. See Bjerk, supra note 28, at 2 (“[T]he plea bargain sentence for each defendant can be
greater than, less than, or equal to the expected sentence from going to trial, depending on the
relative degree of risk-aversion of prosecutors versus defendants and the relative bargaining
power of each party.”); Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 313 (postulating that defendants in cases
where p was equal to 0.75 who had a present-value discount rate of 10% would equate a fifty-
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not alter the basic equation. Prosecutors who are not concerned with
maximizing jail time can cut progressively more attractive bargains with
defendants who have more extensive criminal histories. That means that
repeat offenders should be induced to plead guilty in cases in which
offenders with lesser criminal histories would not. The net effect of this
dynamic, as I discuss below, is to create a lower effective standard of
proof for repeat offenders than for first-timers.
B. P and the Standard of Proof
P is an ex ante prediction made by litigants about how a fact-finder
will assess the proof before them. Where the evidence is weak, p will be
low. Where it is strong, p will be high. It is directly proportionate, in
other words, to the strength of the admissible evidence of guilt.34 The
standard of proof, in contrast, is an ex post rubric used by the fact-finder
to evaluate the strength of the evidence. While the standard of proof is
expressed qualitatively, it can be thought of in quantitative terms as a
probabilistic threshold that the proof must satisfy before the fact-finder
will convict. It is often said that BARD equates to something like a 90%
certainty of guilt, a preponderance of the evidence standard equates to
50.1%, and clear and convincing something in between.35 Different
standards of proof will produce different ex ante probabilities of
conviction given equal quanta of proof. While overwhelming evidence
of guilt will produce a high p under almost any standard of proof, where
the evidence is more equivocal, p will plainly be higher if the standard
of proof is lower, and lower if the standard of proof is higher.
This intuition can be expressed formally as a threshold function,
where p is the likelihood of conviction, q is the quantum of the
evidence, and s is the standard of proof, so that:
p = 1 where q ≥ s and
p = 0 otherwise
This characterizes p in terms of a single event and with subjective
evaluations of q and s by the fact-finder.
Considering p probabilistically, that is, capturing the range of
expected outcomes viewed from an ex ante perspective, p can be
thought of as a distribution determined by q and s, where increases in q
produce increases in p and increases in s produce decreases in p.
Thus, p can be written as:

 1
p = q 
 s
year trial sentence with a present-value sentence of 7.43 years).
34. That is, the net quantum of inculpatory evidence minus exculpatory evidence.
35. See Lerner, supra note 2, at 996. See generally Michael S. Pardo, Second-Order Proof
Rules, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1083 (2009) (discussing various proof standards).
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The equation makes clear that in calculating any px, the quantum of
proof qx and the standard of proof sx are directly related. That is, if the
standard of proof (s) goes up, the quantum of proof (q) necessary to
achieve the same probability of conviction also goes up. If the standard
of proof decreases, the quantum of proof necessary to convict also
decreases. In simple terms, the prosecutor needs less evidence to
convict if the standard of proof is low and more evidence to convict if
the standard is high. At the same time, to achieve any lower px, either qx
can be decreased or sx can be increased.
In short, if a prosecutor can induce guilty pleas for equally serious
crimes, carrying equally severe sentences, from two defendants, D1 and
D2, but can obtain D1’s plea to a set charge and punishment with a
lower p than necessary to induce D2 to plead guilty to the same charge
and punishment, then D1 can be thought of as having negotiated his
plea against what is functionally the equivalent of a reduced standard of
proof.
The following example might help to illustrate the point. Assume
that there are three quanta of proof: q1, q2, and q3. Juries that apply the
BARD standard will convict in the three cases at rates of 70%, 80%,
and 90%, respectively. P thus equals 0.70, 0.80, and 0.90 in the three
cases. Juries that apply the lower clear and convincing standard instead,
given the same quanta of proof, will convict at rates of 80%, 90%, and
100%. Imagine that prosecutors can choose to file cases in BARD court,
where the BARD standard applies, or in C&C court, where the clear and
convincing standard applies. Now, imagine that a prosecutor has a case
in which the proof is q1, and that, given a particular sentence sought by
the prosecutor, it is only rational for a defendant to plead guilty if p is
equal to or greater than 0.80. On these assumptions, there are two ways
the prosecutor can induce the defendant to plead guilty. She can file the
case in BARD court and invest enough additional resources in
investigating the case to raise q1 to q2, or she can file the case she has
in the C&C court. The point here is that either of these strategies has
exactly the same effect on p. Permitting the prosecutor to induce the
same plea from defendants with different p’s under a given standard of
proof is functionally equivalent to applying a lesser standard of proof to
some of those defendants and a greater standard of proof to the others.36
Given the fungible quality of ets, p, q, and s, changes in any one of
the variables has the same impact on rational plea price as changes in
any of the other variables. Increasing expected punishment for repeat
offenders has the same effect—for plea bargaining purposes—as
lowering the standard of proof for such defendants.37 This demonstrates
36. This logic has been implicitly noted by other commentators. See, e.g., Adam
Gershowitz, Raise the Proof: A Default Rule for Indigent Defense, 40 CONN. L. REV. 85, 118–20
(2007) (arguing for remedy of increasing standard of proof in jurisdictions that fail to adequately
fund indigent defense and noting that one effect of higher standard of proof would be pressure
on prosecutors to offer better plea deals to such defendants to entice them to plead guilty).
37. Other scholars have noted that plea bargaining, vis-à-vis trial, seems to lower the
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that plea bargaining in a world of recidivist sentencing schemes and
relatively unconstrained bargaining discretion produces what is, in
effect, a progressively decreasing standard of proof for repeat offenders.
C. Plea Bargaining and the Special Case of First-Time Offenders
The simple model we have been relying upon so far unrealistically
assumes that the gradient of the slope of the expected plea sentence
(eps) is perfectly smooth and that the prosecutor is free to offer any plea
bargain, in any case, anywhere along that slope. That assumption is
unrealistic because the slope available to prosecutors is lumpy, not
smooth. That is, prosecutors cannot precisely calibrate their plea bargain
offers to perfectly match their quantitative assessments of the value of a
guilty plea in particular cases, because they are constrained by the
“depth” and “distance” of charging options provided by the legal code.38
Prosecutors may wish to offer a particular defendant a four-year deal to
resolve, say, criminal charges involving the theft of a computer from an
occupied residence. However, the criminal code may establish a
minimum sentence of five years for robbery and a maximum sentence
of three years for burglary. There may be no practical way, given the
nature of the criminal conduct and the charge and sentencing
distributions provided by the criminal code, to construct a plea deal that
allows the defendant to get a four-year sentence.
Because most criminal codes include numerous overlapping offenses
carrying a variety of punishments, and/or permit the prosecutor wide
discretion to negotiate sentence bargains that reflect just the desired
amount of jail time or monetary fines, lumpiness will not create much of
an obstacle in most cases.39 However, lumpiness does prove to be a
fairly significant problem at the low end of the scale.40 Jail time and
fines, of course, are not the only elements of punishment accompanying
standard of proof. See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, Deterrence and the Conviction of
Innocents, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1321, 1332 (2003) (“However, plea bargaining would appear to
have the effect of implicitly lowering the government’s burden of proof.”); Patricia M. Wald,
Guilty Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: A Norm Gives Way to the Numbers, 1993 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
101, 108–09. Although I disagree with that characterization because it fails to account for the
transfer of risk, the claim is based on logic similar to that presented here.
38. See Ronald F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, The Effects of Depth and Distance in a
Criminal Code on Charging, Sentencing, and Prosecutor Power, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1935, 1953–
55 (2006) (demonstrating that charge reductions frequently made during charge bargaining
occur more often where the criminal code provides more alternative charging options for
criminal conduct (depth) and where the penal consequences of alternative charges are modest
(distance)).
39. Id. at 1955 (explaining that where the criminal code provides depth in charging
alternatives, prosecutors can “offer a market-clearing price for a guilty plea more often”).
40. That is, assuming that the prosecutor is intent on obtaining a felony, rather than a
misdemeanor, conviction. Of course, felony charges are often bargained into misdemeanors, and
that outcome may in fact be the standard outcome in less serious cases involving offenders
without a criminal history. In this Article, “first-offender” means first felony offense, which by
definition involves a case in which the prosecutor refuses to permit a misdemeanor plea.
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a criminal conviction. The collateral consequences of a felony
conviction can be serious and, in many cases, can far overshadow the
costs of a jail sentence alone.41 Depending on circumstances and
jurisdictions, those consequences can include deportation, termination
of employment, loss of a professional license or ability to continue an
accustomed means of making a living, loss of access to government
loans or benefits, loss of custody of children, familial impoverishment,
and dramatic restrictions on place of residency and freedom of
movement, just to name a few.42 Then there is the stigma of conviction
itself. Although the penal consequences of conviction (that is, jail time
and fines) might be felt more or less equally and proportionately by all
convicts, the collateral consequences and stigma accompanying
conviction are heavily front-loaded. First-time offenders almost
certainly have more to lose by way of collateral and stigmatic
consequences than do repeat offenders who have already absorbed most
of these costs.
There are, in other words, some built-in costs that accompany a firsttime felony conviction that cannot be discounted away. That means that
a prosecutor will be more constrained in plea bargaining a weak case
involving a first-time offender than she would in a case involving a
repeat offender. Prosecutors cannot offer deals to first-time offenders
with the same dramatic discounts as are available in cases involving
repeat offenders. Both the expected trial sentence is lower, and the fixed
costs of conviction are higher.43 By limiting how low the expected plea
sentence (eps) can go in first-time offender cases, these constraints
necessarily also establish a floor for p in those cases. Where the
evidence is relatively weak, first-time offenders will hold out for trial
because prosecutors simply cannot make plea offers that are sufficiently
discounted to entice first-time offenders to accept them, given the
collateral consequences that necessarily follow.44 And by establishing a
41. See Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct Consequences
of Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators, 93 MINN. L.
REV. 670, 740 (2008).
42. See generally Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral
Consequences of Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated
Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 634–36 (2006) (enumerating possible collateral consequences
resulting from felony conviction).
43. Although there is no direct evidence of which I am aware that repeat offenders accept
plea offers in weaker cases than first-time offenders, there is empirical evidence that prosecutors
use the enhanced leverage that recidivist sentencing schemes provide in plea bargaining.
Professor Bjerk, for example, has documented an increase in misdemeanor pleas entered by
defendants in cases in which a felony conviction would result in a third-strike triggering
application of a mandatory three-strikes sentencing provision. See Bjerk, supra note 31, at 593
(presenting “formal empirical evidence documenting that one way in which prosecutors react to
mandatory minimum sentencing laws is by systematically becoming more likely to prosecute
those arrested for crimes targeted by these laws for lesser crimes not covered by these laws”).
Other scholars have made similar findings. See id. at 594 n.10.
44. See Ronald F. Wright, Response, Guilty Pleas and Submarkets, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
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floor for p, these constraints also establish a floor for the effective
standard of proof in cases involving first-time offenders, one that
prosecutors can’t evade through plea bargaining.45
In short, the economics of plea bargaining combined with increased
penalties for repeat offenders and the variety of collateral and stigmatic
consequences that hit first-time offenders with special force ensure that
prosecutors can obtain guilty pleas from repeat offenders that the
prosecutors could not have obtained from first-time offenders in cases
with otherwise similar characteristics. Functionally, this is equivalent to
applying a decreased standard of proof to repeat offenders in the
system—plea bargaining—that produces the vast bulk of criminal
convictions.
II. EVIDENCE RULES AND THE DECREASING STANDARD OF PROOF FOR
REPEAT OFFENDERS
The economics of plea bargaining are compounded by a variety of
evidentiary and procedural rules that further disadvantage repeat
offenders. These rules increase the probability of conviction for repeat
offenders, with the same ultimate effect on conviction rates as would
result from application of a lower standard of proof at trial.
A. Repeat Offenders Do Worse at Trial than First-Time Offenders
Repeat offenders face substantially greater risks than first-time
offenders at nearly every stage of the criminal process. During
investigation, police are most likely to begin their investigation by
identifying the “usual suspects.”46 Offenders with criminal records are
more likely to be placed in a line-up or have their picture displayed in a
photo array, are more likely to have fingerprint and DNA samples in
databases available for comparison with specimens recovered at the
crime scene, and are more likely to be questioned by investigators while
their exculpatory stories are less likely to be believed.47
PENNUMBRA 68, 70 (2008) (stating that because “the fact of conviction should concern
[defendants with no prior convictions] more than the amount of punishment, they are more
likely to hold out for a dismissal or an acquittal in a weak case”).
45. This is not to say that prosecutors cannot induce first-time offenders to plead guilty in
weak cases. If the charges are serious and the prosecutor’s discretion is relatively unconstrained,
then prosecutors should have plenty of bargaining leverage to induce a guilty plea. The point
here, however, is that the prosecutor’s leverage will always be relatively smaller in cases
involving first-time offenders because graduated sentencing schemes limit the maximum
punishment that can be expected upon conviction at trial and collateral and stigmatic
consequences of felony convictions limit the minimum punishment that may be offered in plea
bargaining.
46. See Richard Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence: Psycho-Bayesian [!?]
Analysis and a Proposed Overhaul, 38 UCLA L. REV. 637, 672 (1991) (noting that investigation
of crimes often begins “by focusing on those ‘usual suspects’ already known to law enforcement
officials”).
47. See Bowers, supra note 25, at 1125–26 (explaining that “[r]ecidivists are common
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Once charged with a crime, repeat offenders are more likely than
first-time offenders to be denied bail or bond or to have a higher bail or
bond set.48 Studies establish that pretrial detention substantially
increases the probability of conviction.49 Indeed, pretrial detention leads
to worse results for criminal defendants at every subsequent stage in the
process, including sentencing.50 The likely reasons why pretrial
detainees see worse outcomes include the inability of detainees to
gather facts, track down witnesses, or otherwise assist overburdened
defense lawyers to prepare their defense cases; increased difficulties
faced by detainees in communicating with attorneys;51 and an increased
likelihood that detainees will be perceived negatively by jurors who see
them handcuffed or otherwise treated as guilty and dangerous by
marshals and court officers during trial. Pretrial detention also gives the
state new opportunities to gather incriminating evidence. Jailhouse
informants may testify at trial about confessions allegedly made while
the defendant was in captivity. Conversations, phone calls, and mail are
all subject to scrutiny and may turn up incriminating admissions.52
At trial itself, repeat offenders confront hazards not faced by firsttimers. Most importantly, repeat offenders risk the fact-finder learning
of their prior criminal history. Although the rules of evidence nominally
disallow such evidence from being used to establish bad character or
propensity, critical exceptions exist to this bar. Prior crimes may be
admissible, for instance, to show “proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.”53 At least in federal courts, as well as in some states,
first targets when crime happens” and that investigations often commence by asking crime
victims or witnesses to review “mug-shot books composed exclusively of prior arrestees”).
48. See, e.g., Aaron Kupchik, Jeffrey Fagan & Akiva Liberman, Punishment,
Proportionality, and Jurisdictional Transfer of Adolescent Offenders: A Test of the Leniency
Gap Hypothesis, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 57, 77 (2003) (presenting data on the effect of
pretrial detention on juveniles charged with crimes and finding that prior record was an
important predictor of pretrial detention).
49. See, e.g., Douglas L. Colbert, Ray Paternoster & Shawn Bushway, Do Attorneys
Really Matter? The Empirical and Legal Case for the Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1719, 1773 (“[P]retrial detention leads to higher conviction rates and longer
sentences . . . .”).
50. See Cassia Spohn, Race, Sex, and Pretrial Detention in Federal Court: Indirect
Effects and Cumulative Disadvantage, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 879, 893–94 (2009) (showing, in an
empirical study, that pretrial detention is a positive predictor of increased sentence length).
51. Colbert, Paternoster & Bushway, supra note 49, at 1720 (“[T]he delay in defense
investigations and witness interviews caused by pretrial incarceration, impedes preparation of a
defense and is a sure-fire prescription for miscarriages of justice and convicting innocents at
trial.”).
52. Repeat offenders are also marginally more likely to be falsely targeted by informants
because their “general involvement in crime” makes it easier to generate plausible incriminating
accusations. See Robert P. Mosteller, The Special Threat of Informants to the Innocent Who Are
Not Innocents: Producing “First Drafts,” Recording Incentives, and Taking a Fresh Look at the
Evidence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 519, 555 (2009).
53. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
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evidence of a past sexual assault or child molestation offense is
admissible to prove commission of similar crimes as long as such
evidence is deemed relevant.54 In addition, criminal history will almost
always be admissible for impeachment purposes.55 The risk that jurors
might learn about a defendant’s criminal history if he chooses to testify
places an enormous burden on the exercise of the right to testify.56 A
defendant with a relatively minor criminal history may choose to run the
risk of such impeachment. A defendant with an extensive criminal
history almost certainly will not, given the devastating effect that such
information will likely have on the jury’s perception of the defendant’s
guilt.57 Data show that the impact of a jury learning about the
defendant’s prior record is greatest in cases where the evidence of guilt
is relatively weak, suggesting that in close cases, the threat of disclosure
of the criminal record is at its peak.58
Although defendants are formally assumed “innocent until proven
guilty,” and their exercise of the right to silence is not lawfully held
against them, as a practical matter, jurors often assume that defendants
have some obligation to prove their innocence. A failure to rebut—or at
least deny—plausible evidence of guilt put forth by the state will often
cement the jury’s impression of guilt. In some cases, defendants may in
fact have compelling stories to tell. Repeat offenders who cannot risk
impeachment thus will be unable to present that exculpatory evidence.
Such defendants are often limited to trying to poke holes in the
prosecutor’s case rather than construct a coherent alternative narrative
of innocence, which according to many trial strategists, is a far inferior
defense.59 As a result, the defendant’s testimony is often a pivotal trial
54. FED. R. EVID. 413 (sexual assault); FED. R. EVID. 414 (child molestation). California,
Arizona, and the District of Columbia have rules similar to those applicable in federal court. See
Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: The Effect of a
Prior Criminal Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial Outcomes, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
1353, 1375–77 (2009) (citing CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1101(a), 1108(a) (West 2007); ARIZ. R.
EVID. § 404(c); Johnson v. United States, 610 A.2d 729 (D.C. 1992)).
55. See FED. R. EVID. 608–09 (permitting impeachment with prior bad acts and
convictions relevant to truthfulness of witness); Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 54, at 1355 (“All
U.S. jurisdictions allow the use of some criminal convictions to impeach the credibility of a
witness.”).
56. The Eisenberg and Hans study confirms that the existence of a prior record is a strong
indicator that the defendant will decline to testify at trial. In the sample studied by Professors
Theodore Eisenberg and Valerie Hans, 62% of defendants without a prior record testified while
only 45% of defendants with a record testified. The study also disclosed greater disparities
depending on case type, with 93% of defendants without prior records testifying in assault cases
compared with 57% of defendants with prior records. Similar disparities were also reported in
first-degree murder cases. See Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 54, at 1371–74.
57. See id. at 1360–61 (summarizing studies of mock jurors as demonstrating that jurors
who learn about a defendant’s prior record will be more likely to convict because “[t]he
evidence against a defendant with a prior record appears stronger”).
58. Id. at 1381–83.
59. See, e.g., Brian J. Foley, Applied Legal Storytelling, Politics, and Factual Realism, 14
LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 17, 22 (2008) (summarizing presentation by Professor
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event,60 and the defendant’s failure to testify in his own defense can be
outcome determinative.61
Defendants with no substantial criminal history will not be
constrained by these concerns. Such defendants will be better positioned
to directly rebut the state’s charges, explain incriminating evidence, and
present a credible alternative narrative of events. Of course, those repeat
offenders who choose to testify notwithstanding the collateral damage
will likely be perceived as less credible witnesses.62 For all these
reasons, ceteris paribus, repeat offenders will do worse at trial than
first-timers.63
Finally, repeat offenders do worse at sentencing than first-time
offenders as well and not only because of recidivist sentencing schemes,
mandatory minimums, and career criminal statutes. Even absent any
statutory or guideline mandate, judges are far more likely to impose
harsher sentences on repeat criminals than on first-timers.64 In death
penalty cases, jurors are more likely to impose a death sentence on those
with criminal histories than those without.65
Kevin Jon Heller explaining that “in general the best defense is a good alternative narrative”);
see also Sunwolf, Talking Story in Trial: The Power of Narrative Persuasion, 24 THE
CHAMPION 26, 27–28 (2000) (explaining tendency of jurors to understand trial as competition
between competing stories).
60. See Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 54, at 1369–70 (describing data gathered in survey
of judges showing that defendant testimony was considered more important than that of police,
eyewitnesses, co-defendants, and expert witnesses).
61. Friedman, supra note 46, at 666 (observing that in some cases where defendants
decline to testify for fear of character impeachment, their “failure to take the stand is utterly
disastrous, spelling the difference between conviction and acquittal”).
62. This would intuitively seem to be the case. Indeed, the very purpose of permitting
prior convictions to be introduced during impeachment is that they are relevant to credibility.
However, Professors Eisenberg and Hans’ data did not verify that intuition; nor has other
experimental research demonstrated that perceptions of credibility are affected by knowledge of
prior records. See Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 54, at 1387.
63. That outcome has been confirmed in at least one empirical study. See Martha Myers,
Rule Departures and Making Law: Juries and Their Verdicts, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 781, 786–
88, 792–93 (1979) (finding, based on study of 201 Indiana jury trials, that juries are more likely
to convict defendants with numerous prior convictions).
64. For example, the federal sentencing guidelines permit judges to downwardly adjust a
sentence where the court finds the offender was a minor participant in the offense. See U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.2 (2010). Data shows that this mitigating
provision was applied twice as often to defendants without criminal history compared with those
with criminal history. See Michael Edmund O’Neill, Linda Drazga Maxfield & Miles D. Harer,
Past as Prologue: Reconciling Recidivism and Culpability, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 245, 263–64
(2004). Congress has instructed the Sentencing Commission to be more lenient with regard to
first-time offenders. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(j) (2006) (directing the Sentencing Commission to
ensure that “guidelines reflect the general appropriateness of imposing a sentence other than
imprisonment in cases in which the defendant is a first offender”).
65. Not only does a prior criminal record often count as aggravating circumstances and/or
increase the perceived dangerousness of defendants, but some statutes expressly make the death
penalty available only for repeat offenders. For example, South Carolina passed a law in 2006
that allowed the death penalty for repeat offenders of criminal sexual conduct with a minor, but
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B. Comparative Ease of Conviction as a Lower Standard of Proof
The numerous disabilities faced by repeat offenders ensure that if
they choose to fight charges at trial, they will lose more often than do
those who have no prior criminal records. They face what might be
called a “repeat offender tax.” The tax works in a variety of ways. Some
of the disabilities have the effect of increasing the quantum of net
evidence of guilt. Where a defendant is unable to gather exculpatory
evidence that he otherwise might have found because he has been
detained pretrial, and the state’s case remains the same, the net evidence
of guilt increases. The net evidence of guilt also increases when the
defendant’s testimony is made less credible as a result of impeachment,
or when jurors find the prior crime evidence probative of intent, motive,
or modus operandi. In such cases, there is simply more evidence of
guilt—a larger q—and thus a greater likelihood of conviction.
Prior crimes evidence may also directly lower the de facto standard
of proof.66 Once the fact-finder learns of the defendant’s criminal past,
the fact-finder may require less proof of guilt to convict.67 A mere
preponderance of the evidence may well, as a practical matter, satisfy
many jurors (and judges) who know the defendant is a convicted felon.
Professors Theodore Eisenberg and Valerie Hans calculated that, in
cases in which the evidence was relatively weak, disclosure of a
criminal record to the jury alone increased the defendant’s probability
of conviction from an average of one in five to more than 50%.68 And as
we have seen, risk of disclosure of a criminal record is only one of
many ways that criminal procedure disadvantages repeat offenders.
Either way, the disabilities faced by repeat offenders increase the
probability of conviction—by raising q or lowering s—in ways that are
functionally equivalent to a reduced standard of proof.
C. Magnifying the Disparity
As demonstrated above, the increased penalties imposed on repeat
offenders permit prosecutors to negotiate guilty pleas from those
offenders more easily and, because of the pricing realities of the plea
bargaining system, have the functional effect of easing the standard of
proof. Those disparities are further magnified by the various disabilities
that repeat offenders confront should they choose to contest charges at
not for first-time offenders. See S.B. 1138, 2005 Leg., 116th Sess. (S.C. 2005). Although that
law is now unconstitutional in light of Kennedy v. Louisiana, it illustrates the point. See
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2642, 2650–51 (2008) (holding the Eighth Amendment
prohibits the death penalty for raping a child without the intent to kill).
66. See Lillquist, supra note 4, at 160–61 (observing that use of character evidence at trial
likely affects standard of proof applied by decisionmakers at trial and leads to lower standard of
proof for repeat offenders).
67. See Friedman, supra note 46, at 657 (noting the possibility that evidence of prior
crimes may cause jury to “decide that the defendant is a bad person, and thus effectively lower
the prosecution’s burden of persuasion”).
68. See Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 54, at 1385.
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trial. In calculating whether to accept a plea offer, rational repeat
offenders (and their counsel) must discount their chances of winning to
reflect these disabilities. In other words, given any quantum of proof of
guilt, repeat offenders will calculate a higher p than first-time offenders.
Raising p has the same effect, vis-à-vis plea bargaining, as raising the
expected trial sentence. It makes plea offers attractive that would not
otherwise be so. Repeat offenders thus confront a compounded calculus
at plea bargaining: they face potentially longer sentences and have a
higher likelihood of conviction. These factors combine to substantially
increase the relative attractiveness of any particular plea offer, and
function identically to substantially decreasing the standard of proof for
repeat offenders.
III. LONGITUDINAL GUILT
Thus far, I have tried to demonstrate that, in practice, repeat
offenders are convicted subject to a standard of proof below—and
perhaps well below—that applicable to first-time offenders. Arguments
for a variable formal proof standard, such as Professor Laudan’s
suggestion that we should formally adopt lower proof standards for
repeat offenders, seem less compelling once this larger picture of the
criminal process is developed, even if one accepts the assumption that
disparate treatment of repeat offenders is justified by the greater risks of
future criminality they present. As the arguments in this Article show,
formally lowering the standard of proof at trial for repeat offenders
would only further magnify the disabilities such repeat offenders
already face, and those disabilities have their greatest impact not on the
small handful of cases that actually go to trial but on the much larger
pool of cases that are resolved through guilty pleas. If a formal rule
directed jurors to apply a lower standard of proof in cases involving
repeat offenders at trial, it would only make it that much harder for
repeat offenders to successfully contest criminal charges. As a result,
prosecutors would obtain even greater leverage to plea bargain,
resulting in yet harsher sentences and guilty pleas in cases involving
more equivocal evidence of guilt. The risk that innocent persons will be
induced to plead guilty would, of course, also increase. If prosecutors
lacked leverage in plea bargaining, these might be consequences worth
tolerating. There is no reason, however, to believe that prosecutors lack
bargaining leverage or face difficulties inducing defendants to plead
guilty. There is no mob clamoring at the courthouse gates for a trial; just
the opposite: guilty pleas as a percentage of criminal convictions have
been trending upward for decades.69
In this final section, I suggest that, over the course of the past
century and a half or so, our criminal justice system has undergone a
substantial, evolutionary transformation—one largely driven, or at least
69. Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal
Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 90–91 (2005) (describing the steady increase in plea bargaining
rate since 1981).
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made possible, by plea bargaining.70 Whether we acknowledge it or not,
the system as it has developed has in the mine-run of cases abandoned
the goal of making an accurate determination of historical facts at a high
level of certainty (such as BARD embodies) or attempting to apportion
blame and punishment based on that determination. Rather than solve
“crimes,” the system’s primary goal is the identification of “criminals.”
The criminal process as a whole (there are of course exceptions) is no
longer constructed (if it ever was) to determine beyond a reasonable
doubt whether X committed a particular crime on a particular occasion.
Its goal is to make a determination, with as much accuracy as is possible
to muster, that X is “a criminal.”71 That determination occurs over time,
which is why I refer to it as “longitudinal.”
Longitudinal guilt is the system’s implicit rejoinder to criticisms of a
plea bargaining system that permits—indeed induces—defendants to
plead guilty even in cases in which proof is weak or equivocal. Plea
bargaining occurs relatively early in the investigative process, before all
leads have been thoroughly pursued and all potential defenses explored.
Often, defense lawyers and prosecutors negotiate plea deals with little
more in hand than a police report.72 This is not a process likely to reveal
factual nuance. When plea offers represent substantial discounts over
expected trial sentences, as they usually do, rational defendants take the
deals. When the deal is good enough, it is rational to refuse to roll the
dice, regardless of whether one believes the evidence establishes guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, and regardless of whether one is factually
innocent.73 The risk of inaccurate results in the plea bargaining system
thus seems substantial.
The system of longitudinal guilt has safeguards built in to check its
excesses. These safeguards begin with the substantial sentence
discounts themselves inherent to plea bargains in weak cases. The more
uncertainty there is regarding the defendant’s guilt in a particular case,
the more likely the defendant can trade a guilty plea for a nominal
punishment. First-time offenders usually are treated leniently because of
their status as first-timers. They often receive probation rather than a

70. See generally GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA
BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003) (establishing the birth of widespread plea bargaining around
the mid-to-late 19th Century).
71. To use Professor Bernard Harcourt’s language, the criminal system has increasingly
adopted actuarial methods based primarily on prior criminal history and deployed them in order
“to know the criminal and to predict his criminality.” Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Ne’er-DoWell to the Criminal History Category: The Refinement of the Actuarial Model in Criminal Law,
66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 135 (2003).
72. One study found that defense lawyers almost never visited the crime scene, even in
murder cases, and interviewed witnesses in only 4% of felony cases. See Michael McConville &
Chester L. Mirsky, Criminal Defense of the Poor in New York City, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 581, 762–64 (1987).
73. The coercive force of the system is, in fact, at its peak where repeat offenders and
relatively minor crimes are involved. See Bowers, supra note 25, at 1119–22.
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prison sentence.74 First-time felony offenders can frequently get felony
charges reduced to misdemeanors, preserving their status as non-felons.
The process by which convictions are obtained may not provide
absolute certainty, or even remove all reasonable doubt, as to the
defendant’s guilt. But the penalties are usually light. Under the logic of
longitudinal guilt, the proof of accuracy of the conviction is not
necessarily the product of the criminal process, or the evidence, that led
to it; it is the test of time. If the offender stays clean post-conviction, the
dust-up with the courts and police will eventually be forgotten. It is a
minor stain on an otherwise more or less productive life. No harm, no
foul.75
If the offender subsequently finds him or herself again accused of
criminal conduct, however, then suspicions about the offender’s
criminal character are “confirmed.” Given the offender’s criminal
record, potential trial sentences start to increase, and a second
accusation will likely lead to a less generous plea offer than was
available for the first offense. Although the enhanced penalties that
attach to recidivist crimes can be justified with the traditional
retributivist defense of recidivist penalties—that in offending again the
offender demonstrated greater disregard for morality or law76—they are
just as well understood as a kind of ex post facto amendment of the
lighter penalty imposed previously. After all, subsequent incriminating
conduct “lessens” the uncertainty accompanying the earlier conviction
by strengthening the suspicion that the defendant possesses a “criminal”
character.77
In weak cases involving repeat offenders, prosecutors may settle for
a guilty plea and another nominal punishment even though the proof of
guilt in the new case is somewhat shakier than it was in prior cases.
74. In the federal system, according to one study, first-time offenders with no prior
contact with the criminal justice system received sentences carrying no prison time in
approximately 53% of cases, compared with only 9.6% of cases involving defendants with a
criminal history. See O’Neill, Maxfield & Harer, supra note 64, at 264.
75. This is meant somewhat tongue-in-cheek. Of course, for the first-time felony offender,
it is not really no harm, no foul. The collateral and stigmatic consequences of conviction impose
a substantial cost. But the system accounts for that increased cost, to some extent, by providing
more robust protections for such defendants. Because it is harder for prosecutors to plea bargain
a first felony offense, prosecutors have incentives to ensure that the evidence is stronger in cases
involving first-time offenders, and guilty pleas negotiated in such cases will more likely be
induced in strong cases. This, in turn, provides more assurance that the conviction is reliable.
76. See, e.g., id. at 246 (noting the “long-standing idea . . . that repeat offenders are
deserving of greater punishment because they are already familiar with the criminal justice
system and ‘should have known better’”).
77. At least one scholar has explained this phenomenon as an optimal feature of a
punishment system in which the risk of error is high. See Eric Rasmusen, Judicial Legitimacy as
a Repeated Game, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 63, 77 n.31 (1994) (citing Ariel Rubinstein, An
Optimal Conviction Expectation Regime for Offenses that May Have Been Committed by
Accident, in APPLIED GAME THEORY (Steven John Brams, Andrew Schotter & Gerhard
Schwödiauer eds., 1979)).
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Prosecutors may feel comfortable prosecuting the defendant
notwithstanding the evidentiary weakness of the new case because,
given the prior record, less new evidence is necessary to confirm the
repeat offender’s type as “criminal.”78 And so it goes. Repeat offenders
confronting new allegations of wrongdoing face a spiraling set of
consequences. Their prior convictions mean ever-longer expected
sentences, which in turn further encourages them to cut their losses
when they can through plea bargaining, which adds another entry to
their criminal records and makes it even easier for prosecutors to obtain
a guilty plea against them the next time. In this way, an individual might
go from being a first-time offender to a career criminal without ever
having a jury conclude that the evidence proved guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.
At the end of day, however, the system purports to have established
to most everyone’s satisfaction what the criminal record shows: the
defendant’s criminal character, i.e., his “recidivism risk.”79 What one
plea deal didn’t reveal, a career record of criminal convictions proves:
the defendant is a criminal “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Any harsh
penalties reserved for hardened criminals can be imposed without much
worry about investigative or trial error given the increased risk of
recidivism the defendant poses. Even if this conviction has problems,
the defendant has proved his criminality over time. He is longitudinally
guilty.
Of course, this characterization of the criminal process does not
accurately describe the handling of every criminal case. Some cases
receive an enormous amount of attention and resources. Think O.J.
Simpson. In those cases, the system rolls out the whole panoply of bells
and whistles. It really does seem focused on uncovering historical truth,
even when it doesn’t succeed at it very well. Indeed, the concept of
longitudinal guilt may not capture what happens in most very serious
criminal cases, the kind that provoke widespread community attention
and close coverage of the investigation and trial. But it does capture, I
suspect, the far more typical and mundane doings of the assembly-line
criminal justice process that is characterized by overworked prosecutors
and underfunded defense attorneys, and in which even serious criminal
cases go largely uninvestigated, especially by defense counsel.80
78. There is a baseline below which proof of guilt should not drop, provided by the
probable cause requirement. The prosecutor must convince a judge, or a grand jury, that there is
at least that much evidence to initiate charges in the first place. Theoretically, probable cause
equates, more or less, with a more probable than not standard; this suggests that criminal cases
do not lead to convictions, even by guilty plea, unless there is somewhere near a 50.1%
likelihood that the defendant was, in fact, guilty. For a discussion of the relationship between
probable cause and the more probable than not standard, see, for example, Max Minzner,
Putting Probability Back into Probable Cause, 87 TEX. L. REV. 913, 927 n.62 (2009).
79. O’Neill, Maxfield & Harer, supra note 64, at 278 (stating that the Federal Sentencing
“Guidelines’ criminal history measures serve in significant part as a recidivism risk prediction
instrument”).
80. See McConville & Mirsky, supra note 72, at 762–64.
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What can be said in favor of longitudinal guilt? Well, first, it is a
relatively inexpensive system to operate. Longitudinal guilt uses the
cheapest dispute resolution tactic—plea bargaining—to obtain most
criminal convictions. By making guilty pleas cheap, plea bargaining
reduces the investigative and prosecutorial resources needed to build
adequate cases against defendants. That means that investigators and
prosecutors can better ration their resources across cases and increase
the deterrent effect of law enforcement.81 Second, the drop in accuracy
in individual cases is compensated for by an increase in accuracy over
time. Longitudinal guilt may well produce “accurate” results, in terms
of identifying persons who have found themselves consistently on the
wrong side of the law, as long as we accept a definition of accuracy
based on the proposition that where there is smoke, at least most of the
time, there is fire too. More importantly, perhaps, it has proven effective
in identifying those who are most likely to find themselves on the
wrong side of the law in the future. If the accumulation of a criminal
record makes relatively clear who the bad guys are, it also, in turn,
facilitates their management and control. Longitudinal guilt, in other
words, is the predicate for the “new penology” built upon actuarial
forms of risk management applied to crime control.82
Longitudinal guilt necessarily places more emphasis on the initial
stages of the criminal process. Where the resolution of criminal charges
is heavily front-loaded, the content and type of the initial accusations
and their alleged factual predicates are more likely to go unchallenged.
Indeed, there is a movement afoot to incorporate prior arrests as well as
prior convictions into criminal history sentencing calculations because
prior arrests have been shown to be almost equally predictive of future
criminality.83 This means that initial decisions about arrests and charges
made by law enforcement officers will tend to have relatively greater
importance and thus increase police power to make credible threats of
legal penalties. This marginal increase in police power may assist them
in maintaining order on the streets by magnifying their power to shape
legal outcomes through arrest and offense characterization decisions.
What are the costs of a system constructed around the concept of
longitudinal guilt? There is, of course, the risk of error. There will be
cases, for sure, where a trial conviction would be sufficiently disastrous
that the collateral and stigmatic consequences will seem a small price to
pay to avoid the risk. In those cases, potentially innocent defendants
may well agree to falsely plead guilty to a serious charge. It is even
81. See Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 309 (explaining that prosecutors prefer plea
bargaining because it permits redeployment of “released resources” for “use in other cases, thus
increasing deterrence”).
82. Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A
Retrospective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 11–
12 (2003). See generally JONATHAN SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE: PAROLE AND THE SOCIAL
CONTROL OF THE UNDERCLASS, 1890–1990 (1993).
83. See O’Neill, Maxfield & Harer, supra note 64, at 248.
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conceivable that such an individual, through a chain of unfortunate
calamities, could be repeatedly dragooned into the system and, by way
of aggressive loss-cutting, accumulate a criminal record
notwithstanding innocence. But the likelihood of that happening seems
remote. As noted above, the system of longitudinal guilt imposes the
strongest de facto protections on first-time offenders, making wrongful
convictions of such offenders relatively unlikely.84 Although its
protections diminish for repeat offenders, it increasingly relies on
statistical (im)probabilities to reduce the risk of systemic error. Even if
justice provided no more accuracy than a coin toss, the odds that the
coin will keep coming up heads becomes, at some point, statistically
implausible. Moreover, even the severest critics of the system would
probably concede that the probability of guilt in most cases exceeds a
mere 50.1%, which is, in theory, its absolute floor.85 So accuracy seems
a relatively minor concern.
A greater concern, however, is the possibility that longitudinal guilt
is a self-reinforcing system.86 Individuals who get caught up in the
criminal justice system early in life get “tagged” as criminals. The
stigma and collateral consequences that follow that early labeling affect
the choice-set available to them. If individuals with criminal records
cannot get jobs, social services, or student loans, criminal activity might
well present an attractive, and perhaps the only, alternative source of
income. If “decent” society shuns convicted criminals, then the “street”
may be the only society open to them.87
Longitudinal guilt is predicated on the essentialist premise that
“true” criminals will reveal themselves through repeated criminal
conduct, a claim that has won a fair measure of statistical backing.
Perhaps the strongest criticism of longitudinal guilt is its tendency to
disregard the possibility that criminals are made and not born, and that
the system is the maker. In other words, longitudinal guilt may well
confuse the problem with the solution; it fails to acknowledge that
criminality might not be inherent in the character, genes, or
psychological profile of offenders but rather could be a “problem with
84. See Bowers, supra note 25, at 1121–22 (arguing that risk of wrongful conviction is
greatest for repeat offenders who commit relatively minor crimes).
85. See discussion supra note 78. Whatever theoretical floor is established by the
requirement that criminal charges survive the scrutiny of a probable cause determination, I think
it is additionally safe to assume that most prosecutors would not prosecute if they did not
believe the defendant was, at the least, more probably guilty than innocent.
86. Professor Harcourt refers to this problem as the “ratchet effect,” by which he means
that statistically targeted populations in the criminal justice system will not only be subject to
disproportionately more policing and punishment but will also be perceived by society as
especially prone to criminality, thereby limiting their reentry options. See Bernard E. Harcourt,
Henry Louis Gates and Racial Profiling: What’s the Problem? 17–20 (John M. Olin Law &
Econ. Working Paper No. 482 (2d Series), 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1474809.
87. Professor Elijah Anderson uses these terms in his classic qualitative study of street life
in inner city communities. See ELIJAH ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET: DECENCY, VIOLENCE,
AND THE MORAL LIFE OF THE INNER CITY 35 (1999).
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prisons, punishment, or the lack of reentry programs.”88 The next
criminal conviction may, in short, not prove that the defendant’s
essential nature is “criminal” but reflect only the economic and social
pressures of life as a convicted criminal, or indeed, nothing more than
the increased difficulty of defending a criminal case as a repeat
offender.
IV. CONCLUSION
The plight of convicted criminals in our society, unforgiving as it is,
is not the primary point of this Article. What I set out to show is simply
that, by and large, repeat offenders do not receive the same benefit of
the doubt as first-time offenders. The plea bargaining system accounts
for upwards of 90% of all criminal convictions.89 As some
commentators have observed, plea bargaining is not merely an aspect of
our system of justice; it is our system of justice.90 In that system,
prosecutors have enormous discretion to bargain with defendants and
thereby determine the outcomes of prosecutions. Defendants, of course,
have the ultimate power to decide whether to take the deal. Assuming
that defendants bargain rationally, however, the two primary
determinants of whether a deal is worth taking (setting aside the costs of
litigation) are the sentences they expect to receive if they lose at trial
and the probability that they will lose. Those two factors determine the
economic value of a plea offer. Because expected sentences and the
probability of losing at trial increase for repeat offenders, first-time
offenders and repeat offenders are not on a level playing field.
Prosecutors can induce repeat offenders to take plea offers that firsttimers should rationally refuse. That is the equivalent of reducing the
standard of proof for repeat offenders at trial. Without a stronger
showing of a crisis of dismissals or acquittals of repeat offenders, it
seems to me that the burden of proof for lowering the burden of proof,
so to speak, rests with those who believe the current disadvantages that
repeat offenders face do not already account for the greater actuarial
risks presented by them.

88. Harcourt, supra note 71, at 151.
89. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2000 at 457 (Kathleen Maquire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 2001)
(reporting that 91% of all state court felony convictions in 1996 were obtained by guilty plea).
90. Cf. Rudolf J. Gerber, On Dispensing Injustice, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 135, 145 (2001)
(“Plea bargaining is not just a part of Arizona’s justice system; today it is the system. More than
ninety-five percent of defendants enter guilty pleas.”).
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